Problems for Infinitism by Wynroe, Keith
Res Cogitans
Volume 5 | Issue 1 Article 3
6-4-2014
Problems for Infinitism
Keith Wynroe
University of Cambridge
Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.pacificu.edu/rescogitans
Part of the Philosophy Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CommonKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Res Cogitans by an authorized
administrator of CommonKnowledge. For more information, please contact CommonKnowledge@pacificu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Wynroe, Keith (2014) "Problems for Infinitism," Res Cogitans: Vol. 5: Iss. 1, Article 3. http://dx.doi.org/10.7710/2155-4838.1095
Res Cogitans (2014) 5:10-15                                        2155-4838  | commons.pacificu.edu/rescogitans 
 
 
Problems for Infinitism 
 
 
Keith Wynroe 
University of Cambridge 
 
Published online: 4 June 2014 
© Keith Wynroe 2014 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Infinitism in epistemic justification is the thesis that the structure of justification consists in infinite, non-
repeating series. Although superficially an implausible position, it is capable of presenting strong 
arguments in its favour, and has been growing in popularity. After briefly introducing the concept and the 
motivations for it, I will present a common objection (the finite minds problem) as well as a powerful 
reply which couches Infinitism in dispositional terms. I will then attempt to undermine this counter-
objection by drawing parallels between it and the problems raised against semantic dispositionalism by 
Kripke’s exegesis of Wittgenstein’s private language argument. 
 
 
 
 
I 
 
One of the most obvious responses to infinitism is the finite minds objection. The 
objection itself if extremely simple, but its ramifications are rather complex. Given the 
assumption that we are in fact finite creatures (with finite minds), and given that 
propositional justification consists in infinite non-repeating chains, it follows that we 
can never have doxastic justification for any proposition whatsoever. Thus, infinitism 
so conceived renders us impotent against the sceptic who claims that we can never be 
justified in our beliefs, regardless of whether or not the proposition itself is justified.  
 
The response of the infinitist is to claim that doxastic justification does not consist in 
the agent “containing” the entire infinite chain in her head, but instead in the agent 
having an appropriate second-order disposition such that, when prompted, she will 
justify her belief with the proposition which is in fact the next in the chain. Thus, 
although she does not contain in her head the entire infinite list of reasons, and the 
correct order, she has something similar to a schema the mastering of which gives her 
the ability to make any of an infinite number of steps, despite it being only finite itself. 
This is analogous to mathematical functions, or meta-linguistic rules of inference which 
can patently be defined over an infinite domain, yet fully grasped by an infinite agent. 
 
 
Res Cogitans (2014) 5                                                                                                           Wynroe | 11 
 
 
 2155-4838 | commons.pacificu.edu/rescogitans 
II 
 
I will now sketch what I believe to be an insurmountable problem for this dispositional 
response, with reference to Kripke’s interpretation of the private language argument, or 
“Kripkenstein”. The argument attempts (I feel successfully) to demonstrate that the 
notion of assigning some fixed, internal “meaning” to our terms is an incoherent one. 
This is shown by the infamous addition/quaddition dilemma. Define quaddition as the 
function Q such that for some z 
 
For all numbers x and y less than z, quaddition behaves exactly like addition 
Q(x,y) = 5 otherwise 
 
The challenge is to give a reason for supposing that we “meant” addition rather than 
quaddition with our use of “plus” (when z is sufficiently large). Both are equally 
compatible with the evidence. The standard response to this is semantic 
dispositionalism, which relies on a dispositional account of the meaning of our use of 
“plus”. Thus, although quaddition and addition are both compatible with the evidence 
so far presented, had we been asked “What is z plus z?” we would have given the value 
of z+z rather than 5. The problem with this is simply that it misses the point. If there is 
a matter of fact about which function we mean by “plus”, this results in normativity 
such that the agent is only justified in her answer to questions containing “plus” if she 
is doing it right and sticking to the semantic rule. In other words, we are not asking for 
an account of which response the agent would have given, but an account of what 
justifies that response.  Merely giving a descriptive account of what an agent happened 
to be disposed to do is insufficient. After all, we are disposed to get it wrong 
sometimes, and given our finite lives we will never be able to answer certain “plus” 
questions. Simply giving an account of the speaker’s disposition towards the use of the 
term cannot give us the meaning unless we can weed out these wrong uses. The fact 
that we are disposed to use the term incorrectly demonstrates that meaning cannot be 
defined as our dispositions. We are disposed to use “plus” in all sorts of ways in various 
circumstances, the important issue is to find out which pattern of usage is the right one. 
The crucial point is that there is no non-circular means by which we can pick out the 
circumstances in which the agent is using the word correctly. To see this, we only have 
to ask ourselves why we would not count certain “slip-ups” as also constituting our 
meaning of “plus”. The only answer is that they do not count because they were 
instances in which we were mis-using the term. But this is patently circular. Similarly, 
the only way the semantic dispositionalist can line up our dispositions and the addition 
for immense numbers (which we could never actually calculate in our lives) is by 
stipulating certain properties (such as immortality, larger brain capacity etc.). But there 
are infinitely many ways of tweaking the agent such that she has these properties, and 
many result in different dispositions (addition-like, quaddition-like etc.) the only way 
the semantic dispositionalist can make use of these idealising thought experiments is to 
specify which tweaking is the right one. But again this is wholly circular, since 
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choosing an addition-like tweaking begs the question. This is the essence of what is 
dubbed the Problem of Multiplicity It is crucial to observe that the Kripkenstein 
argument does not undermine there being well-defined mathematical functions such as 
addition and quaddition. What is undermined is the coherence of designating one of 
these as the “meaning” of our term “plus”. 
 
We are now ready to construct our objection against the more sophisticated form of 
infinitism. As we saw above, assigning semantic properties on the basis of a disposition 
over an infinite domain led to severe problems. What about epistemic properties? For a 
proposition p, there are infinitely many infinite non-repeating chains which purport to 
justify p. Some work and some don’t (they will have faulty steps in at least one place). 
Now, just as the sceptic above questioned the coherence of claiming that one function 
in particular could be extracted from our disposition as its “meaning”, we can question 
the coherence of the infinitist’s claim that one particular chain of propositional 
justification can be extracted from our disposition as the actual justificatory basis of the 
agent. The upshot of this would be this: since there is no matter of fact about which 
chain the agent is following, and doxastic justification depends on which grounds the 
agent believes the proposition, it follows that there is no fact of the matter as to whether 
or not the agent is doxastically justified.  After all, we will occasionally slip up when it 
comes to justifying our belief when prompted. And as the chain becomes more and 
more abstract we will take longer and longer to provide the next step in the chain, such 
that conceivably somewhere along the chain the justificatory step will take longer than 
we live. Both of these observations are obviously parallel to the semantic argument, and 
we can see that in order for the infinitist to respond, he must be able to give a reason as 
to why certain justificatory steps we are disposed to make aren’t constitutive of which 
chain of propositional justification which forms the grounds of our belief, and must 
give a reason as to why one idealised agent which follows chain A should be thought to 
represent the actual agent rather than another idealised agent which follows chain B. 
However, it should be obvious that this cannot be done. Just as the semantic 
dispositionalist cannot give a distinction between mistakes and the following of a rule 
which does not appeal circularly to the rule, so too the dispositional infinitist cannot 
explain why certain justificatory inferences which the speaker is disposed to make does 
not constitute his justificatory grounding without explicitly presupposing some 
inferences are mistakes. 
 
III 
 
Where do we go from here? The infinitist has a seemingly fatal problem on his hands: 
his theory entails that, not only can we never show whether or not an agent is 
doxastically justified in a belief, there is not even a fact of the matter about doxastic 
justification. The infinitist perhaps would look for important areas of dissimilarity 
between the epistemic and semantic arguments, and seek to show that these areas are 
crucial to the private language argument. Most prominently, he might point to the 
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important notion of idealised conditions. The semantic dispositionalist ultimately failed 
due to his inability to give a non-circular account of those conditions which separated 
correct uses of the word from the incorrect ones i.e. he failed to account for the 
normativity which is essential to rule-following and thus private language. Can we 
assume that there is equally no such non-circular account of ideal conditions for 
justificatory inferences? It seems not. While it is obvious that in the case of language, 
misuses of “plus” can only be said to be so simply because it wasn’t what the agent 
really “means”, we seem to have a better grasp when it comes to epistemically ideal 
conditions. For one thing, they crop up a lot more in philosophical literature. Chalmers 
relies heavily on the notion of an ideal reasoner for his account of two-dimensional 
semantics. Putnam, Cripsin Wright and others use the notion of epistemically ideal 
conditions in one way or another to define truth. 
 
But this is not as promising as it might first seem. Chalmers speaks little or nothing 
about what ideal conditions consist of. Instead, he simply defines an ideal modal 
reasoner as someone whose epistemic space perfectly corresponds to metaphysical 
space, giving no reductive account of how this might come about. As for the accounts 
of truth, definitions of epistemically idealised conditions range from insufficiently 
spelled out to inadequate. One common approach is to define ideal conditions as having 
all relevant evidence readily available. This clearly fails as an adequate account since, 
as well as the relevant information, coming to a true belief requires executing the 
appropriate inferences following from that information. Our aim here is to demarcate 
when our justificatory disposition is being properly followed and when it is not, yet 
clearly, the idealised conditions mentioned above do not guarantee this in any way. One 
important point to note is that, even if we could find a reductive account of conditions 
which would result in infallible inferences, this would be missing the point. For what 
we are looking for is a reductive account of conditions when an agent follows their 
actual disposition accurately, and since people can ultimately be unjustified and thus 
following a faulty disposition, these conditions must make those agents make faulty 
inferences in the right places. Thus, this project in the end is less promising than it 
originally seemed. 
 
However, a more successful response might be to exercise a companions-in-guilt 
argument and claim that if the conclusion can be swallowed for something even more 
central i.e. meaning, perhaps the same can be done for justification. Indeed, 
Kripkenstein offers a sceptical solution which accepts the private language argument 
and provides a deflated account of meaning. Roughly, mastery of a word no longer 
consists in the internalisation of a specific rule, which has been shown to be an 
incoherent notion, but instead consists in the approval of the linguistic community as a 
whole. Thus, using “plus” correctly is not determined by whether or you are following 
a semantic rule properly, but instead by whether or not your behaviour and performance 
is approved by those around you. Perhaps the infinitist could say that ascribing 
justification is similarly a pragmatic process which occurs when the agent meets the 
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standards of his community. This ties in with what Klein suggests elsewhere for other 
reasons. Klein suggests that the ascription of doxastic justification is acceptable for 
pragmatic purposes even when the agent has only shown herself to be following the 
correct chain to the extent which the epistemic context requires (i.e. in everyday talk we 
do not have to check many steps at all before we can acceptable say that our 
conversational partner is justified). Of course, this differs greatly from the sceptical 
solution in that, when proposing this, Klein still believes that there is an over-arching 
fact of the matter as to whether or not the agent is justified proper. However, once this 
pragmatic idea is in place, the jump to a sceptical infinitist solution is not too far.  
 
But the prospects of the infinitist appropriating this response appear dim when we note 
some particular consequences of the sceptical solution. One (obviously) is that the 
concept of private language is abandoned. There is no talk of what “meaning” an agent 
has in his head attached to each term and no talk of whether someone is using language 
properly without respect to a community. What you “mean” by a term (and thus what it 
takes for you to use the term “correctly”) therefore consists merely in the approval of 
the community. Thus, a Robinson Crusoe from birth cannot speak a language and 
cannot be said to mean anything. This is an acceptable result (and even perhaps 
attractive one for someone won over by Quine), but the analogous consequence for the 
infinitist seems much worse. Are we to accept that Robinson Crusoe could never be 
justified? Does justification merely consist in your inferences satisfying the standards 
of your evaluators? Perhaps this is an acceptable conclusion to some. Maybe the reason 
why the conclusion that Robinson Crusoe would never be justified seems wrong is 
because we are imagining him and finding his inferences acceptable or unacceptable. 
The matter therefore requires us to observe the distinction between context and 
circumstance of evaluation. Here the analogy with language comes apart somewhat, 
since for us to claim his behaviour has meaning since the appropriate behaviour would 
only come about due to interaction with others. Those who are fond of deflationary 
accounts which, say, reduce meaning to communal approval or truth to agreement may 
be happy to define justification as being able to satisfy others in the community. 
 
These deflationary accounts are of course highly contentious. Having to swallow this 
outlook in order to maintain their position in epistemology will undoubtedly be an 
unwelcome result to many infinitists. However, to those who are already sympathetic to 
them, this result may in fact be a positive find, a step towards a coherent view which 
spans the philosophical spectrum. 
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